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This paper studies three horizontal policy instruments and two vertical 
ones in Chilean industrial policy, particularly regarding small and medium 
enterprises (SMEs). The horizontal instruments are (1) a guarantee 
program for borrowing by SMEs (FOGAPE), (2) a small subsidy to new 
exports that was applied from 1985 through 2003, and (3) the innovation 
subsidies provided by the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción 
(CORFO). The vertical policy instruments are the activities of Fundación 
Chile (FCh), a semi-public entrepreneur cum venture capitalist, and a 
CORFO program to attract foreign direct investment in information 
technology. Although most programs are well designed, they are 
numerous and insufficiently funded; Chile could benefit from a 
prioritization of needs and consolidation of these programs. Moreover, the 
instruments for making strategic bets on new sectors are particularly weak. 
In particular, FCh needs to refocus its activities on high-risk projects with 
long payoffs, something it cannot do with its small endowment.   
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 1.  Introduction 
 
Chile has had a long and varied history with industrial policy, from heavy reliance on the 
state to guide industrialization to a total free-market approach. Today, a basically 
horizontal approach to industrial policy designed to correct what are perceived to be 
important market failures is giving way to a renewed interest in vertical policies that 
concentrate government efforts in selected sectors. However, policymakers are groping to 
understand fully what this entails and which instruments are most likely to bring about a 
diversification of Chile’s productive and export profiles, which are still dominated to a 
very large degree by mining, particularly copper.  
  This study reviews the productive development policies currently applied in 
Chile, evaluates their successes and failures, and makes recommendations for improving 
the functioning of the industrial policy framework. Our first task is to classify industrial 
policies. For this we use a matrix in which policies are categorized according to whether 
they are horizontal or vertical in nature and whether they are delivered through the 
provision of public goods or through interventions in the market mechanism (i.e., through 
taxes or subsidies). Horizontal policies address market failures which affect broad sectors 
of the economy, while vertical policies aim at promoting specific sectors, whether new or 
existing ones. Almost all of the policy instruments examined in this paper are 
implemented through market interventions. Most are horizontal and a few are vertical in 
nature.  
  It is beyond the scope of this study to carry out a full welfare-economic evaluation 
of industrial policy tools in Chile. We are interested in whether policies have been able to 
achieve their stated objectives and whether those objectives themselves are sensible from 
the point of view of economic theory. Answers to the following questions will be sought:  
 
(1) Horizontal policy instruments have been instituted based on the 
rationale that they are needed to correct economy-wide market 
failures. Are they achieving their objectives and, if so, to what extent? 
(2) Vertical policy instruments have been advocated on the grounds that 
the market alone is slow and inefficient in developing new 
comparative advantages. Some policies that we will study have a clear 
  2vertical orientation. The appropriate question to ask is whether the 
institutional framework set up and the amounts of resources with 
which they are endowed are sufficient to achieve the goal of 
diversifying the economy. A subsidiary question is whether the 
direction in which these policies are seeking to move the economy is 
the correct one, given the country’s resource endowments and the 
direction in which the world economy is moving.  
 
In the first section, we examine the general landscape of industrial policy and how 




(1) guarantees for loans to small enterprises (FOGAPE);  
(2) a small subsidy to new exports in use from 1985 through 2003 (the so-
called “simplified drawback”);  




(4) the activities of a semi-public entrepreneurial institution (Fundación 
Chile) responsible for the development of the salmon and blueberry 
industries (among other less notable examples); and 
(5) CORFO’s program of FDI Attraction in High Technology. 
 
The major conclusion of this study is that Chilean policy has recently embarked 
on a transition from an emphasis on horizontal policies stressing corrections of specific 
market failures that affect the economy as a whole, and particularly SMEs, which 
prevailed from the 1980s until around 2000, to a more vertical emphasis on specific 
clusters of industries, most of which have already shown that they have developed, or 
could develop, a comparative advantage. Some of these industries are well established. In 
                                                 
1 We treat Innova Chile as a horizontal program although it does have an increasingly vertical component. 
As discussed below, since the more vertical approach has emphasized sectors with demonstrated 
comparative advantage, the firms that apply for these resources do not differ as to sector of provenance 
from those that used to apply when no effort was made to choose sectors.   
  3this case, the aim of policy is to bring them up to the technological frontier. Others are 
still in the incipient stages, but in most cases they already have a track record in 
exporting. The most important industries being targeted are those related to mining and 
food. A new emphasis on IT can also be detected. The effort is to redirect instruments 
used to implement horizontal policies to the strengthening of selected clusters without 
excluding the possibility that new industries may appear spontaneously. Most policy 
instruments use up-front subsidies in a matching-grant modality. Tax incentives have 
generally not been part of the policy framework. The recently instituted tax rebate for 
R&D expenditures is an exception.  
Most of Chile’s industrial policy framework is of the type described by 
Hausmann, Rodrik, and Sabel (2007) as “industrial policy in the small.” In other words, 
the main thrust of policy makers has been to solve market failures, improve productivity, 
and raise the technological content of existing sectors. There is only one institution 
devoted to making strategic bets (“industrial policy in the large”): Fundación Chile. 
Within CORFO, there is one program that also has this objective, the program of FDI 
attraction in high technology.  As argued below, the resources devoted to these efforts 
have been too meager to bring about sustainable changes in the productive and export 
structure. 
The major problem of most Chilean industrial policy instruments is that they are 
not endowed with sufficient resources to make them successful. A related problem is the 
proliferation of programs, which makes it very difficult for any specific program to attain 
the scale needed for success. This is true of all of the programs examined in this study. 
Given the fact that the premier development institution, CORFO, does have its own 
resources that would allow it to make a difference if these resources were concentrated in 
the most promising programs, the major recommendation of the study is that efforts 
should be concentrated on fewer programs. Some of the good candidates are examined in 
detail here: FDI attraction in high technology, the Innova Chile programs, and Fundación 
Chile, which is in need of an endowment yielding sufficient income to undertake projects 
with long gestations and provide infusions of resources that are beyond its capability at 
the moment. Other successful horizontal programs, such as FOGAPE, could be scaled up 
at very little cost to the state. The same can be said of CORFO’s second-tier development 
  4banking arm, the Gerencia de Intermediación Financianciera (GIF), whose operations 
are too varied and the resources devoted to each type of operation too small for it to be an 
effective development bank. 
 
2. Overview of Industrial Policy in Chile  
   
2.1 Import Substitution and State-Directed Development 
 
The import substitution stage of Chilean development (roughly from 1938 to 1973) saw 
an increasing emphasis on industrial policy. Not only did the government protect 
domestic industry through high tariffs but, in addition, state agencies became the most 
important entrepreneurs. Whole swaths of the industrial sector sprung up under 
government entrepreneurship: steel, petroleum extraction and processing, sugar, 
vertically integrated electricity generation and distribution, and telecommunications, 
among others. Contrary to conventional thinking, many of these proved profitable. The 
center-left Popular Front government that came to power in 1938 proceeded quickly to 
institute an ambitious industrialization policy. The Corporación de Fomento de la 
Producción (CORFO), a new development agency established in 1939 with broad 
attributions, including those of being a development bank, was charged with 
implementing the policy. With the nationalization of copper, begun during the Frei 
government in the 1960s and completed by the socialist regime of Allende in 1971, the 
state became the major producer in the Chilean economy. In addition, the State Bank 
(BancoEstado) became a key actor in the channeling of credit to the productive sectors of 
the economy, much of it at subsidized, negative real interest rates.
2 
The allocation of credit even by commercial banks was centrally directed in what 
became a classic example of financial repression.
3 The maximum expression of these 
policies was reached during the Allende government, which nationalized much of 
manufacturing and all of the private commercial banks.  
                                                 
2 BancoEstado is a state-owned commercial bank set up in the 1940s to grant credit to sectors favored by 
industrial policy and to SMEs that did not have adequate access to commercial banks, and to provide 
savings vehicles for consumers. It remains one of the most important actors in the financial sector of the 
economy, providing a wide variety of financial services mostly to SMEs and small savers. It is profitable 
and does not require government subsidies.   
3 That financial repression was swept away in the mid-1970s, to be replaced by liberalization without 
regulation that culminated in the crash of 1982. For a marvelous account of that episode, see Díaz-
Alejandro (1985).   
  5  Since the military coup of 1973, with very few but significant exceptions, until 
very recently Chile had basically eschewed vertical industrial policies. Although the 
consensus is changing, it is still very difficult to talk about sector selection, as “picking 
winners” is still viewed with deep suspicion. Even during the military regime, and more 
so since the return to democracy in 1990, a number of market failures have come to be 
recognized: credit constraints affecting SMEs and university students from low-income 
backgrounds, workforce training, the public-goods nature of some types of export 
promotion or food safety regulations, and, especially, innovation. 
  The new military regime carried out a sweeping trade policy reform (arriving at a 
uniform tariff of 10 percent in 1979), returned to the private sector the manufacturing 
firms and banks nationalized during the Allende government, gradually removed all 
credit controls, and, generally, attempted to establish a model as close as possible to a 
pure market economy.
4 It removed practically all restrictions on foreign direct investment 
(FDI), but it did not grant preferential treatment to foreign companies. In fact, it 
attempted to create a level playing field for all participants, favoring neither sectors nor 
specific types of actors.
5 The reforms had a pervasive influence on Chilean economic 
policy, to the point that, until recently, any new intervention proposed by the government, 
think tanks, or academics has tended to be met with a great deal of skepticism. 
 
2.2  Industrial Policy during the Military Regime 
 
Industrial policy of the horizontal variety began to make a comeback even before the 
return to democracy. It was recognized that markets failed in significant respects, and 
certain policy instruments were deployed to correct these failures. Perhaps the earliest 
was the recognition that generic export promotion (improvement of the country’s image 
abroad, attendance at trade fairs, etc.) had important externalities. Thus, early on, the 
military regime set up ProChile, an agency attached to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
and placed it in charge of such activities. Since then, it has grown and has branched out in 
a number of directions, carrying out activities with other state agencies such as CORFO. 
  In recognition of the externalities involved in training, the regime set up SENCE 
(Servicio Nacional de Capacitación y Empleo). To this day, it operates mostly in 
                                                 
4 Significantly, it did not privatize the state copper company, but it did open mining to foreign investors.  
5 The reforms of the military regime are described in detail in Meller (1996).  
  6unchanged form. SENCE certifies firms that are entitled to provide training services. 
Companies that require training can hire a certified institution and deduct the expenses 
from profits, up to a maximum of one percent of its wage bill. Paredes and Riveros 
(1994) provide a description and analysis of this institution.  
  Small and medium enterprises have long been supported through a variety of 
technical cooperation programs and special financial vehicles. These programs are 
managed by Servicio de Cooperación Técnica (SERCOTEC), an institution that existed 
prior to the dictatorship and has survived to this day. Among them are several technical 
assistance and loan programs. SERCOTEC also subsidizes the preparation of loan 
applications by micro and small enterprises (MSEs). 
  Another important program initiated in the mid-1980s (and abandoned in 2003 as 
a result of the agreements reached during the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations to 
eliminate export subsidies) was the so-called reintegro simplificado (see Ffrench-Davis 
and Sáez, 1994). This instrument represented a small subsidy to new exports. In lieu of 
having to apply for a drawback of duties paid on imported inputs, small exports received 
up to a 10 percent subsidy on the value of its exports. This percentage declined when the 
entire tariff line (defined at the eight-digit SITC level) surpassed a certain threshold and 
disappeared altogether at a higher value of exports (see below for details). In modern 
terms, the mechanism can be viewed as a clever way of subsidizing self-discovery 
(Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003) and letting the market select the sectors to be promoted. 
The amounts involved were small, and the feature of its automatic discontinuance 
discouraged rent-seeking. The fact that the continuation of the subsidy depended not on 
individual firm exports but on those of all firms exporting the product ensured that it was 
in effect a subsidy to infant exports.  
  Perhaps the most glaring departure from neutrality was the policy toward the 
forestry sector (see Rossi, 1995). Here, the military government made what amounted to 
a strategic bet on a non-existent but potentially profitable sector. It had long been known 
that radiata pine grew faster in certain parts of Chile than practically anywhere else in the 
world.  
The authorities in effect solved a coordination problem that made this sector take 
off. This involved legal changes, a subsidy large enough to entice private investors into 
  7the sector, the provision of credit, and efforts to train the human capital needed for this 
particular sector. Early in the military regime, Decreto Ley 701 gave broad incentives to 
planting and replanting trees for commercial exploitation. It declared that lands planted 
under DL 701 could not be expropriated by the state and granted cash subsidies of 75 
percent of the costs of planting and the initial management of forests. In addition, 
between 1974 and 1979, the Central Bank maintained special (and subsidized) credit 
lines, managed through BancoEstado and private banks, for forestry companies and 
individuals who engaged in forestry development. These subsidies were put to good use 
by recently graduated forestry engineers emerging from three universities (Universidad 
de Chile, Universidad Católica, and Universidad Austral). The state gradually abandoned 
the production of wood and the management of forestry plantations.  
  Although this policy package has not been subjected to an ex-post cost-benefit 
analysis, judging by the importance of the sector in today’s Chilean export basket and by 
the rapid increase in export values, the policy does appear to have played an important 
role. From practically nothing in 1975, today’s exports of wood, wood products, pulp, 
and paper amount to over US$5 billion and account for about 8 percent of Chilean 
exports.
6 Unfortunately, more sophisticated products have been slow in developing. For 
example, wood furniture exports still languish at values below US$30 million. Although 
modified from time to time, this instrument is still used today. 
  The second departure from neutrality has been the activities carried out by 
Fundación Chile. As noted above, FCh has been practically the only instrument for 
industrial policy in the large. It can be considered an ingenious (semi-public) combination 
of an instrument for making strategic bets and a venture capitalist in a context where 
there is no such segment in the capital market. FCh was set up in 1975, its creation being 
part of the settlement between the Chilean government and IT&T for the nationalization 
without compensation of the Chilean telephone company during the Allende 
administration. FCh carries out a number of activities, most of them involving innovation 
or self-discovery (in the sense of Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003). One of its major 
activities has been to set up profitable companies in new sectors of the economy and then 
                                                 
6 Exports in nominal US dollars have been greatly influenced by the sharp increase in commodity prices 
since 2003, and particularly by the phenomenal rise in copper prices.  
  8sell them off to the private sector (either national or international). In the late 1970s it was 
responsible for adapting Norwegian technology salmon cultivation tecnology to Chilean 
conditions (see Achurra, 1995).  
 
2.3 Industrial Policy from 1990 to the Present 
 
2.3.1 The Types of Instruments Used 
 
Nowadays, the government deploys myriad instruments mainly through CORFO, but also 
through other institutions such as ProChile and even the line ministries (e.g., the Ministry 
of Agriculture, with Servicio Agrícola Ganadero, SAG). These are listed in Table 1 
according to the classification of policies into the four quadrants identified above: 
horizontal programs implemented through the provision of public services (HP, of which 
law and order or the ease of doing business are prime examples); HM programs, or 
horizontal programs involving market interventions (through taxes or subsidies); vertical 
programs with public service delivery (VP); and vertical programs cum market 
intervention (VM). Since the early part of the current decade, this insistence on 
horizontality has been giving way to a more realistic appraisal of the need to achieve a 
critical mass in the provision of government support, in line with the “doomed to choose” 
argument of Hausmann and Rodrik (2006).
7  
  Most policy instruments fall in the HM quadrant. With one exception, this 
description applies to all CORFO programs. We have classified Innova Chile programs to 
encourage innovation as basically of the HM type. Although the programs support 
innovation generally on a first-come, first-served basis, since 2006 a deliberate effort has 
been made to steer innovation subsidies to the nine clusters identified for special attention 
by the National Council on Innovation for Competitiveness (NCIC). It should be noted, 
however, that most of the clients of the program, and indeed the clusters identified in the 
                                                 
7 Interestingly, in an interview with Carlos Álvarez, the current Executive Vice President of CORFO, he 
stated that, since the first democratic government of President Aylwin (1990-94), there has been an active 
debate inside the administration between those favoring vertical policies (usually by adherents of the left-
wing parties of the governing Concertación coalition) and those opposing them (the Christian Democrats 
and some more “liberal” members of the left-wing parties). While the “horizontalists” have won the day up 
to now, since the Lagos administration (2000-2006), the “verticalists” seem to be on the upswing. The new 
thinking is reflected in the CORFO program to attract FDI in information and communications technology, 
in some features of the CORFO INNOVA program, and in the proposals of the Consejo Nacional de 
Innovación para la Competitividad (see below). 
  9white books of the NCIC, do not differ markedly from those that one would have 
expected to apply for innovation subsidies, given Chile’s comparative advantages.  
The one important policy instrument in the VP quadrant is the range of activities 
carried out by SAG, which has an important role in ensuring food safety at the borders, 
controlling the quality of food exports so that they comply with foreign phytosanitary 
requirements, and entering into sanitary and phytosanitary agreements with countries 
with which Chile has free trade agreements.  
Below we discuss in detail two clearly vertical policy tools. One is Fundación 
Chile, and the second one is the program to attract FDI in information technology, 
instituted in 2000. FCh is difficult to classify into the two approaches through which 
vertical policies can be implemented. In fact, it should be in a category of its own: as 
noted above, it is an instrument for placing bets on new sectors or technologies, which 
later will be imitated by the private sector. On the other hand, the program to attract FDI 
in high technology is clearly of the VM type, since it is implemented through up-front 
subsidies. In fact, it represents a rare instance of VM policies in the Chilean arsenal.  
  There is another vertical market intervention, not so benign in this case, which is 
worth mentioning: the special protection offered to some agricultural goods through 
tariffs that are higher than Chile’s so-called uniform tariff. Since the mid-1980s, the 
government has run a system of price bands for wheat, sugar, and vegetable oils and 
oilseeds. This system was inspired by the European Union’s Common Agricultural 
Policy.  It was originally intended to smooth the impact on domestic producers and 
consumers of the volatility of international prices. In practice, however, tariffs have 
always been above Chile’s flat tariff for all other goods, transforming the price band 
system into a clearly protectionist measure. The farm lobby in Congress cuts across 
political parties. Deputies and senators from farm areas, across the political spectrum, 
have consistently voted to defend the interests of farmers to the detriment of consumers. 
The Free Trade Agreements signed by Chile with Mercosur (1996) and the United States 
(2003) require the country to eventually dismantle its system of farm protection, but over 
long phase-out periods. 
 
  
  102.3.2 The Institutional Framework 
 
Over the past two decades, Chile has been in the process of building an institutional 
framework for industrial policy stressing the correction of market failures and heavily 
reliant on innovation. This latter term is not to be construed only as the commercial 
application of ideas that are at the frontier of knowledge, although this is certainly an 
aspect of the aim of policy. Innovation also encompasses what Hausmann and Rodrik 
(2003) call “self-discovery”, i.e., the introduction into the country’s production 
possibilities of a set of ideas that are being used elsewhere. As the economy has grown 
more sophisticated, innovation strictu sensu has become an explicit policy goal. It has 
also come to be recognized that innovation cannot be pursued in a vacuum and that 
efforts must be concentrated on specific sectors that are within reach, given the country’s 
existing or potential comparative advantages, and that have strong growth prospects in 
the international economy.   
  The system has been evolving along a scheme that has two major funders: the 
Innova Chile program run by CORFO, on the one hand, and the National Council on 
Innovation, Science and Technology (CONICYT, Consejo Nacional de Investigación en 
Ciencia y Tecnología). There are other sources of funding for innovation, but they are 
smaller in terms of resource volume and are more specialized sector-wise.
8 The basic 
distinction between CORFO and CONYCIT is that the former specializes in subsidizing 
the demand for innovation by enterprises and the latter the supply of knowledge, mainly 
by universities and research institutes.
9 These institutions channel resources that come 
from the state budget and from the so-called mining “royalty,” which is a 3 percent tax 
surcharge on mining profits earmarked for business innovation and allocated by the 
CNIC.
10 The users of these funds are individual firms; Fundación Chile, either by itself or 
in joint ventures with private firms; and consortia of universities and private firms, 
usually business associations (see Figure 1). 
                                                 
8 These are Fondo de Innovación Agraria (FIA), Iniciativa Científica Milenio, and Fondo de Innovación 
Pesquera (FIP). 
9 The boundary between supply and demand is not airtight, since both CONYCIT and CORFO provide 
funds for consortia between firms and universities.  
10 Sensu strictu, the annual amounts that go into the Fondo de Innovación para la Competitividad (FIC), 
whose allocation is recommended by the Council, is determined by a formula which ensures that the FIC 
will have a smooth flow of resources from year to year and will not be dependent on the price of copper.  
  11  Up to now, most of the financing available for R&D has been of a relatively 
short- to medium-term nature, usually no longer than three years. In addition, the 
amounts of the grants have rarely exceeded one million dollars. This has been true of 
CORFO innovation projects as well as those financed by CONICYT. This may be 
changing with two new lines of financing for universities and for consortia of universities 
and enterprises, whereby financing is made available from CONICYT on a much larger 
scale and for longer periods of time (Iniciativa Científica del Milenio for universities and 
Financiamiento Basal for consortia of universities and business firms). 
 
2.3.3 The Special Role of CORFO 
 
CORFO is a complex institution with a number of industrial policy functions (see Table 
2). Over the years, that role has evolved considerably. Since 1990 it has been conceived 
mostly as a second-tier institution, either in its subsidy or its lending operations. Most of 
its programs are of a horizontal nature, although a few of the new programs begun during 
this decade have veered toward a vertical approach. It has four distinct roles, each one 
corresponding to a separate department, or Gerencia: (i) the provision of subsidized 
services to SMEs (Gerencia de Fomento); (ii) investment promotion, of which the 
attraction of FDI in information-technology-related services is the most interesting from 
the point of view of this study; (iii) a variety of innovation subsidies, now managed 
through a special committee (Innova Chile); and (iv) several financial programs that 
basically provide long-term capital to SMEs (Gerencia de Intermediación Financiera, 
GIF).  
  CORFO has its own resources. During the Allende administration, CORFO acted 
as a holding company for nationalized enterprises. As they were sold off during the 
military government, CORFO began making investments in the financial system. The 
income it obtains from these investments essentially funds the operations of GIF.
11 
CORFO’s operations account for almost 0.3 percent of GDP. The most important ones in 
terms of resources are those of GIF (see Table 3). 
The Gerencia de Fomento runs programs whose aim is to promote the association 
of small firms to enhance the provision of services with economies of scale, upgrading 
                                                 
11 Formally, the earnings on CORFO’s assets go into the state budget, which then returns it to the institution 
for the purpose of making long-term credit available to SMEs through GIF.  
  12the quality of production in order to participate in supply chains with larger firms, or 
adopting new technologies. They operate on the basis of the matching grant principle, 
with CORFO’s contribution constituting normally up to 50 percent of the costs, with a 
maximum amount per firm and per program. The Gerencia de Fomento runs a large 
number of programs, including PROFO (Proyectos Asociativos de Fomento), PDP 
(Programa de Desarrollo de Proveedores), FAT (Fondo de Asistencia Técnica), FOCAL 
(Fomento a la Calidad), and many others (e.g., encouragement of movie and audiovisual 
production and various subsidies to feasibility studies in energy efficiency, environmental 
protection, irrigation, and artisan fisheries). Most of these programs have been operating 
since the early 1990s, when CORFO’s activities were completely revamped. The total 
amount spent in 2007 was about US$46 million. The resources for these programs are 
managed at the regional level by intermediaries, normally business associations. As a 
purely funding agency, CORFO does not deal with beneficiaries. Rather, it allocates 
resources to each regional office for each program according to the demand for them until 
the budgeted amounts are used up.  
  The GIF is much larger in terms of resources. It manages 13 different lending 
windows, most of which are aimed at providing long-term, investment-oriented loans to 
SMEs. Two of the programs provide long-term financing of university studies in Chile at 
the undergraduate and graduate level. All of these windows represent horizontal policy 
instruments aimed at relieving financial constraints perceived to be holding up investment 
by SMEs or investment in education. No effort is made to steer investment into particular 
sectors or university students into specific careers.  
  As noted above, CORFO ceased to be a first-tier bank in 1990. Before the change 
in its financial character, CORFO had a serious problem with delinquent loans. This 
problem no longer exists as all of CORFO’s funding is now provided in a second-tier-
bank modality through credit lines auctioned to private financial institutions and 
BancoEstado on the basis of the interest rates that these institutions offer to charge 
borrowers.  
  At the end of 2006, the GIF portfolio was around US$1.1 billion. While this may 
seem like a large number, when measured against needs for long-term financing by 
SMEs, it is too small. In terms of the size of the domestic credit market, the GIF portfolio 
  13accounts for 1.1 percent of the total portfolio of the Chilean financial system, much 
smaller than Mexico’s NAFIN (9.7 percent), Colombia’s BANCOLDEX (5.3 percent), or 
even El Salvador’s BMI (3.5 percent).  
  Given the small scale of its financial operations relative to the size of Chile’s 
financial sector and the need for long-term resources by firms that do not have access to 
them, it may be a good idea to scale up GIF and convert it to a bona fide development 
bank. All of GIF’s operations are managed by a small staff of 27 professionals, not all 
with banking experience. GIF does not have separate accounts from the rest of CORFO 
and is currently unable to operate as a true second-tier development bank. If its resources 
were increased to a level that would enable it to function as a development bank, it would 
be advisable to separate CORFO’s development banking function from its technical 
cooperation activities, as was done with the Innova Chile program, which has its own 
governing body.    
  Fomento and GIF—and, to a large extent, Innova Chile as well, fall within the 
approach to industrial policy that was prevalent during the 1990s, which stressed 
horizontal instruments designed to deal with perceived market failures. Fomento’s 
programs are all geared to improving the technological and managerial capabilities of 
SMEs and assisting them to reap economies of scale, regardless of the sector in which 
they operate. GIF deals with the paucity of long-term financing faced by this segment of 
the enterprise universe.  
  In recent years, this approach has been giving way to a more vertical approach, 
which has gained impetus from the publication of two influential white papers on 
innovation for competitiveness.  
 
2.4 The Two “White Papers” of the National Council on Innovation for 
Competitiveness 
 
While the new policies have yet to yield significant results, it is clear that policy makers 
have already moved away from the notion that horizontal policies are the best suited to 
the country’s long-term growth. Nowhere is this revisionist approach more evident than 
in the two recent white papers released by the National Council on Innovation for 
Competitiveness (2007 and 2008). The Council (CNIC) was set up by President Bachelet 
at the beginning of her mandate in May 2006.  
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creation of platforms that are useful for several sectors (horizontal policies that solve 
specific market failures, e.g., the development of a venture capital segment of the capital 
markets); and (2) strategic bets on specific industries. The CNIC has embraced selectivity 
on much the same basis as the Hausmann-Rodrik (2006) argument (“doomed to choose”): 
resources are scarce and results can be obtained only when a critical mass of resources 
has been invested in a particular sector. Moreover, the provision of any kind of 
infrastructure involves some sector selectivity, because public goods have a sector bias. It 
is also argued that the fruits of investments of this sort mature with long lags.  In fact, the 
CNIC specifically mentions the provision of public goods as the preferred instrument of 
public policy to implement the vertical dimension of its proposal.  
Thus, the second report states that the public sector has two major tasks. On the 
one hand, it must develop public goods that are specific to the sector. On the other hand, 
it must strengthen the generic platforms that have a broader impact on the economy. The 
latter reduces, without entirely eliminating, the risk of placing bets on particular sectors.  
  The first report specifically rejects the notion laid out in recent work by 
Hausmann and his coauthors (see in particular Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik, 2005) that 
what you export matters, and that countries need to move away from natural resources in 
order to achieve fast growth. It rejects the notion of a natural resource curse and puts 
more emphasis on the “how” than on the “what.” The clusters selected for promotion are 
those in which Chile has already demonstrated a comparative advantage, and the effort, 
according to the CNIC’s reports, should aim at building on those successes by 
introducing advanced technology into production and moving upstream or downstream. 
For example, in the case of mining, it sees Chile moving toward engineering services in 
mining, or chemicals for mining, or mining machinery, rather than abandoning the sector. 
Natural resources are seen as springboards to development, rather than as a curse. 
Implicitly, it takes as models not Korea or China but Australia, New Zealand, and 
Finland.  
Armed with the results of a study awarded to Boston Consulting Group through 
competitive bidding, the first report of the CNIC recommends that productive 
development policies focus on selected clusters that (1) show good prospects in world 
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shown schematically in Figure 2.  
The clusters mentioned in the report are the following: 
 
1.  Strategic bets: 
a.  copper mining  
b.  aquaculture  
c.  fruit production  
d.  beef, pork and poultry 
e.  offshoring services  
f.  tourism 
g.  processed foods 
 
2.   Broad-based “platform” sectors: 
a.  financial services 
b.  transport and logistics  
c.  construction  
 
The report places a great deal of emphasis on improving the horizontal 
instruments currently in use and developing new ones. Greater attention to the vertical 
dimension of industrial policies would be achieved through the correction of market 
failures that prevent the full development of the chosen clusters rather than through 
generic, industry-specific subsidies. As noted, the provision of sector-specific 
infrastructure is also contemplated as a key policy instrument.  
The report advocates the use of instruments that are already in the arsenal of 
policy makers rather than introducing substantial changes to the instruments that are 
currently in use. For example, the attraction of FDI in high technology will continue, but 
it has already been oriented to the needs of the clusters identified in the reports of the 
CNIC.  
The CNIC also proposes that, in order to minimize rent-seeking and capture by 
bureaucratic interests,  the entity be made permanent and that its members be nominated 
by the President and ratified by the Senate, much in the same manner as the procedure for 
choosing members of the Central Bank’s Board. In order to minimize intertemporal 
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the President. In addition, the proposal adopts a checks-and-balances approach to policy 
making and recommends that membership in the CNIC be assigned to academics, 
business leaders, and high government officials. The Ministers of Finance, Economy and 
Education would sit on the CNIC, with a right to voice but not vote, much as the Minister 
of Finance may attend the meetings of the Central Bank’s Board but cannot vote.  
 
2.5 Growth and Export Discovery in Chile in 1990-2007 
 
This introduction to the detailed discussion of major PDPs in use at present would be 
incomplete without a broad-brush description of Chilean growth and export performance 
in recent years. Growth accelerated beginning with the recovery from the financial crisis 
of 1983-84. From 1985 through 1997, growth averaged over 7 percent per annum. 
Although the rate of investment (at 2000 prices) was not spectacular, the growth rate was 
the fastest in Chile’s history (see Table 3). Growth was clearly export-led, as exports 
grew more rapidly than GDP.  
Table 4 also shows that GDP and export growth have slowed significantly since 
1997. In spite of the boom in copper prices and the large investments in the sector by 
foreign companies, the country has been experiencing modest growth, even after the 
recession of 1998-2003. The slow growth of exports and the slowdown in the emergence 
of new exports could well have much to do with this subpar growth performance.  
Table 5 shows the evolution of exports by main product category. Copper and 
other minerals loom ever larger in the export basket, mainly because of the sharp increase 
in prices since 2003. In 2007, they accounted for 58 percent of all exports. If exports are 
valued at 2003 prices, however, the share of copper and other minerals fell from 47 
percent in 1990 to 35 percent in 2007. In volume, non-mineral exports did very well 
during 1990-2007. The big winners were wine (with a growth rate of over 20 percent per 
annum); salmon and trout; wood, pulp and paper, and wood products, and a catchall 
category of “other manufactures,” which includes a large number of products. The 
success of salmon exports can be directly ascribed to one of the instruments we will be 
studying (Fundación Chile). Wine exporters have been the beneficiaries of several 
CORFO programs, to be discussed below. The important group of “other manufactures” 
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benefited from the reintegro simplificado. 
We also carried out an exercise of “export discovery” in the sense used in Agosin 
and Bravo-Ortega (2007). We used a database kept by the Central Bank, which identifies 
447 products exported by Chile in the period 1990-2007. A product is classified as an 
“export discovery” the year it overtakes the limit of US$1 million and thereafter does not 
fall below that level in the sample period (up to 2003, since we wanted to exclude the 
possibility of a product exceeding the limit for less than five years). Of all the products 
discovered during the period, we classified those exceeding US$20 million in 2007 as 
“successes.”  
As can be seen in Figure 3, export discoveries tend to bunch in the period 1991-
1997, exactly the same result found in Agosin and Bravo-Ortega (2007) with the Feenstra 
database,
12 which covers all products at the four-digit SITC level in the 1962-2000 
period. Between 1998 and 2003, export discoveries fell off dramatically. Agosin and 
Bravo-Ortega (2007) tested an empirical model showing that the real exchange rate had 
powerful lagged effects on export discoveries. The main reason for this pattern of export 
discoveries may have much to do with the lagged impact of real exchange rate changes. 
The earlier period followed a dramatic real depreciation of the peso in the 1980s, which 
was slowly unwound during 1991-1997. The subsequent period might have been 
influenced by the previous period’s currency appreciation.  
Be that as it may, a significant number of export discoveries (155, to be exact) 
took place in between 1991 and 2003. Several of these wound up as export successes. In 
fact, by 2007, 15 food products and 23 manufactures discovered in 1991-2003 were being 
exported in values exceeding US$20 million (see Table 5). What is interesting about 
these products is that they are almost all related to Chile’s comparative advantage base in 
food and minerals. Whether policy had a role in these developments remains to be 
determined. Perhaps a more active support of activities of clusters related to the country’s 
comparative advantage and incorporating modern technology, such as has been advocated 
in recent years, might have led to more export discoveries and greater export successes. 
Thus, the more “vertical” approach implicit in the CNIC’s white papers is likely to be a 
                                                 
12 See http://www.cid.ucdavis.edu.  
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pursued are appropriate to the task and that the resources allocated to them are sufficient.   
  In spite of these export successes, Chilean exports continue to be heavily 
concentrated in unprocessed copper. A more rapid diversification in the recent past might 
have led to a higher rate of growth.
13  This seems to be the implicit assessment behind the 
recommendations of the CNIC’s white papers, which stress a more vertical approach to 
industrial policy than what has been in evidence in the past.  
   
3.  Horizontal Instruments 
 
3.1 Borrowing Guarantees for Small Businesses (FOGAPE) 
 
Micro and small enterprises (MSEs) do not usually have adequate access to credit, mainly 
because they are unable to post collateral and/or do not have a track record of timely 
repayment. Most small firms must rely on internally generated resources (plus financing 
from family and friends) for both investment and working capital. In addition, when they 
do obtain financing from the formal banking system, it is likely to be considerably more 
expensive than for medium or large firms, or even for consumers.  
The availability of credit (or lack thereof) has long been identified as a constraint 
to investment by small firms generally, regardless of sector. Chilean policymakers have 
attempted to deal with this problem in a variety of ways. As noted earlier, SERCOTEC 
and CORFO have loan programs for small businesses, and SERCOTEC runs a subsidized 
loan preparation scheme for microenterprises. However, the most important tool to 
address this problem is The Small Business Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantía para 
Pequeños Empresarios—FOGAPE). Launched in 2000, FOGAPE is funded and run as a 
separate entity by BancoEstado. It seeks to guarantee a certain percentage of the credit 
granted by public or private financial institutions to MSEs, small exporters, and small 
business associations.  
  In Chile, perhaps due to the existence of FOGAPE, the share of micro and small 
firms having access to credit is extremely high and considerably higher than in other 
countries, even the United States. In December 2004, almost 70 percent of formal micro 
enterprises had a bank loan (Larraín, 2008). The figure for small enterprises was 93 
                                                 
13 For an argument along these lines, see Agosin (1999) and Agosin (2009).  
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14 At the end of 2007, it is estimated that the corresponding figures had risen to 93 
and 100 percent. In the United States, the Survey of Small Business Finances estimates 
that, in 2003, about 60 percent of all small and micro enterprises had a bank loan. The 
figures for Chile are likely to be overstated, because they do not take into account the vast 
universe of informal microenterprises. Nonetheless, they do suggest that formal micro 
and small enterprises have been gaining significant access to bank financing. 
  Where the record is not as impressive is with regard to interest rates. In September 
2008, while very small loans (of up to UF 200) paid an annual rate of interest of 37.7 
percent, medium loans of between UF 200 and 5,000 were charged 22.2 percent, and the 
cost of credit for large loans in excess of UF 5,000 was only 11.2 percent.  
  There is also qualitative and quantitative evidence that small enterprises face 
difficulties in their access to investment resources, credit being available mainly for 
working capital. Not only are interest rates high, but longer-term credit tends to be 
unavailable. As noted above, this is the problem that CORFO/GIF seeks to tackle.  
  FOGAPE guarantees a certain percentage of the capital amount of lending 
operations from banks to MSEs (including leasing and factoring), small exporters (with 
export value of up to US$16.7 million), and eligible associations of small business 
owners who cannot post adequate collateral. BancoEstado auctions guarantee rights 
among private banks, which must use them during the time limit established in the 
auction (currently, seven months).  
The administrator receives the commissions paid by the banks, with which it 
finances defaults. Commissions are assigned according to the risk classification of each 
bank, and it must be paid in advance. Beneficiary firms must pay a user fee to the bank, 
which has a maximum of 2 percent of the guaranteed capital. Clients must submit 
evidence of ability to pay and must not have defaulted on loans before the application for 
a FOGAPE guarantee. The guarantees can be used to secure credit for working capital 
(purchase of inputs, suppliers’ payments, sowing and cultivation costs, expenses for 
consultancies and training), investment projects (purchases of machinery, expenses 
                                                 
14 In Chilean usage, microenterprises had sales of up to UF 2,400 (about US$80,000 in early November 
2008), and small enterprises had sales between UF 2,400 and 25,000 (about US$800,000). The UF (Unidad 
de Fomento) is a unit in constant purchasing power. It is corrected each day to reflect the change in the cost 
of living index the month before.  
  20related to plant building, acquisitions of commercial property), and capital contributions 
to a business firm. Small business associations may use the guarantees for infrastructure 
investment, equipment purchases, and irrigation and drainage projects.  
  Until 2004, the number of existing clients (stock) grew very rapidly and has now 
stagnated at about 42,500 (see Table 6). The volume of guaranteed credits also rose until 
2004 and has leveled off since then. At the end of 2007, total guarantees stood at US$516 
million. As guarantees are a fraction of the loans granted, new guarantees granted each 
year follow more or less the same pattern and amounted to US$376 million at the end of 
2007. The stock of outstanding guarantees (new guarantees minus those freed by loan 
repayments) stood at US$549 million at the end of 2007. 
The reason that guarantees seem to have stagnated in 2004 is that the fund’s 
capital allowed for a leverage of 10 times, which was used up by the end of 2004. The 
fund’s capital was supplemented by 15 percent in early 2008, with an additional number 
of guarantees made possible by an increase in leverage to 11 times. The fund was thus 
able to auction an additional US$110 million in 2008.  
About one-third of FOGAPE’s financing goes to the commercial sector. This is 
followed by various kinds of services (26 percent), the remainder being allocated to 
agriculture, transport, manufacturing, and construction. Over 63 percent of loans with 
FOGAPE guarantees have maturities of over a year, which contrasts with about 58 
percent for all lending to small and medium enterprises.  
As noted above, FOGAPE is run by BancoEstado, which invests in the local 
capital markets the funds provided by the government, about US$60 million at the 
exchange rate prevailing in early November 2008. Since its inception in 2000, FOGAPE 
has had a small profit every year. The auctions are based on the lowest guarantee portion 
of loans received from financial institutions. Bidders are ranked from the lowest to 
highest guarantee percentages. The resources requested by the banks are added up until 
the funds are exhausted.  
FOGAPE is clearly a horizontal policy instrument. Its funds are not provided 
directly by the government, which acts as a second-tier institution. The only case in 
which there is an explicit choice of recipients in that small exporters receive a certain 
allocation of funds separately from other businesses (5 percent of the total). 
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difficulty accessing credit, and this is the market failure that FOGAPE addresses. Smaller 
firms tend to face this problem more than larger established firms, owing to informational 
asymmetries and adverse selection. Guarantees seek to get around the problem of lack of 
collateral and the informational opacity of small firms. Guarantees allow banks to 
manage problems of adverse selection when granting a loan and the problems of moral 
hazard once the loan has been granted. Likewise, guarantees can reduce transaction costs, 
since a financial institution is able to evaluate the guarantee at a lower cost than it would 
take it to appraise a firm’s business proposal.  
In addition, FOGAPE addresses a regulatory failure. Basel II provisioning norms 
require banks to set aside a higher percentage of reserves against bad loans the higher the 
risk of each loan class. Lending to SMEs is particularly risky and, therefore, provisioning 
against losses is higher than for larger firms. This makes banks reluctant to lend to SMEs. 
The guarantee program frees bank resources to be lent to larger firms and lowers the 
overall level of reserves that banks must maintain. This makes them keen to bid for 
portions of the guarantee program. This, in essence, is the approach taken in the study of 
Benavente, Galetovic, and Sanhueza (2006).   
Thus, FOGAPE can be seen as an intervention model whose essence is the 
encouragement of lending to clients perceived by banks and regulators as riskier and who 
lack sufficient collateral to lower that risk. The fact that lending is a repeated game also 
helps to lower the moral hazard of lending to this segment of the business population.  
FOGAPE can be seen as having two major effects. One is to offer financing to 
firms that had no access to it. The second one is to help firms change the source of their 
financing, from more expensive informal sources to formal institutions. Likewise, 
FOGAPE may have an impact on interest rates. Since FOGAPE reduces the risk of 
lending, and banks set interest rates according to the riskiness of their clients, it is highly 
likely that the existence of FOGAPE results in lower interest costs for its users.  
An instrument such as FOGAPE can be considered an exercise in risk-pooling 
where the government assumes the contingent liabilities of defaults. In a sense, this kind 
of arrangement overcomes a coordination problem: small firms on their own are unable to 
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themselves. This is why there is a need for state intervention.  
The costs to the state of an institution such as FOGAPE are negligible. Since most 
MSEs are credit constrained and need FOGAPE to access credit markets in the initial 
stages of their relationship with the formal banking system, default rates are likely to be 
very low. This is indeed the case. It is estimated that risky loans were about 5.7 percent of 
the total in 2007. However, actual losses amounted to only 1.2 percent (Larraín, 2008). In 
addition, the fixed cost of administration of the fund is very low (0.15 percent). 
Is FOGAPE reaching its target borrowers? A recent study by Larraín and Quiroz 
(2006) shows that less than 3 percent of FOGAPE guarantees is used by medium and 
large firms. These are likely to be exporters singled out for special treatment by the fund.  
Are FOGAPE resources sufficient? A program such as FOGAPE ought to 
generate demonstration effects such that the number of SMEs gaining access to credit is 
much larger than those benefiting from the program. In the long run, the objective is to 
make the program unnecessary because the market failure has in fact disappeared. It is 
hoped that, through the fund, banks gain experience dealing with clientele such as its 
beneficiaries, which will stimulate them to broaden their portfolio of such loans.  
One of the requirements for such a favorable outcome is for the program to have a 
critical mass that will generate durable impacts on capital markets. This would be the 
case if SMEs become an important business niche for banks. Larraín and Quiroz (2006) 
found evidence that FOGAPE has encouraged banks to enter the realm of micro and 
small enterprise financing. There are presently 17 financial institution utilizing FOGAPE. 
However, the use of FOGAPE is heavily concentrated in five large banks, which raises 
some question as to whether it has generated a generalized interest in this kind of 
financial operation.  
In December 2007, total lending by Chilean financial institutions was on the order 
of US$118 billion. Lending with FOGAPE guarantees totaled US$516 million, or just 
0.44 percent of total lending. In terms of number of firms, the stock of FOGAPE clients 
was 42,499, a little over 3 percent of all firms in Chile. There is a large universe of firms 
outside the purview of the banking system that could benefit from a larger FOGAPE. 
FOGAPE’s costs are minimal and are mostly contingent in nature. Since the default rate 
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costs can be considered negligible. Therefore, the benefits clearly outweigh the costs, and 
there is a good case for vastly enlarging the program, which can be considered a great 
success.  
There are a number of problems with FOGAPE. One is that it is run by 
BancoEstado, which is also a bidder for funds. This may raise some concerns about 
moral hazard and preferential allocation of guarantees to BancoEstado programs. Second, 
CORFO runs a similar program, the Investment Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantías 
para las Inversiones—FOGAIN), for firms that do not qualify for FOGAPE. It may be a 
good idea to transfer the management of FOGAPE to CORFO and to unify both 
programs.  
 
3.2 The Reintegro Simplificado 
 
The reintegro simplificado (RS) was, in effect, a small subsidy for new exports. It was 
instituted in the mid-1980s and eliminated in 2003, in order to comply with the Subsidies 
Code of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations (Ffrench-Davis and Sáez, 1994). In lieu 
of having to apply for a drawback of duties paid on imported inputs, small exports 
received an export subsidy of up to a 10 percent. This percentage declined when the 
entire tariff line (defined at the eight-digit SITC level) surpassed a certain threshold and 
disappeared altogether at a higher value of exports. In modern terms, the mechanism can 
be viewed as a clever way of subsidizing self-discovery (Hausmann and Rodrik, 2003) 
and letting the market select the sectors to be promoted. The amounts involved were 
small, and the feature of its automatic discontinuance discouraged rent-seeking. The fact 
that the continuation of the subsidy depended not on individual firm exports but on those 
of all firms exporting the product ensured that it was in effect a subsidy to infant exports.  
  The RS was established at the end of 1985 in order to allow exporters of non-
traditional exports to receive a payment of 10 percent of the value of exports in lieu of 
having to file for a drawback of import duties paid on imported input. The reason given 
for the value of the benefit was that the uniform tariff at the time was 20 percent and the 
average import content of non-traditional exports was estimated at 50 percent. In point of 
fact, it is highly likely that the 10 percent payment contained a significant subsidy 
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Economy using a simple rule: the entire tariff line should not exceed US$7.5 million.  
  The threshold value of exports that determined the loss of the benefit was raised 
annually by the Ministry to take inflation into account. In 1987, it introduced two tiers to 
allow for the gradual loss of the subsidy. In 1988, the sales of inputs to exporters 
qualifying for the RS were added to the list of beneficiaries. Beginning in 1991, three 
rates began to be used for the RS: 10 percent for exporters on products with a total value 
of exports of less than US$10 million, 5 percent for exporters on products valued between 
US$10 and US$15 million, and 3 percent for exporters in products valued between 
US$15 and US$18 million.  
  As a follow-up to the Uruguay Round’s Code on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Duties, in the mid-1990s, even though no complaints had been received from trading 
partners, the democratic government declared its existence as a subsidy to the World 
Trade Organization and promised to dismantle it, which it finally did in 2003, when 
export subsidies were due to disappear altogether. It is doubtful that any trading partner 
would have complained: the maximum subsidy for any given product was US$1 million 
for all exporters, and, if successful, by the time any partner filed a complaint, the subsidy 
would have disappeared. How to recreate it in a manner consistent with WTO may be an 
important task for a revamped industrial policy. 
  As a result of this decision, in 1998 the higher percentages of subsidy were 
reduced annually until they reached a uniform level of 3 percent in 2003. In addition, that 
year, in order to continue qualifying for the RS, firms were required to have an imported 
content of at least 50 percent,
15 whereas before the requirement had been exactly the 
opposite: a national content of at least 50 percent. This made application for the RS 
unattractive, and the amounts paid by the Treasury on account of the RS fell off 
dramatically (Figure 4). 
    Figure 4 reveals some interesting facts. Subsidy amounts rose very quickly 
between 1991 and 1998, mainly because this was the period in which export discoveries 
exploded. They peaked in 1998, as a consequence of the subsequent reduction in the 
                                                 
15 By then, the uniform tariff was 6 percent. This explains the requirement of an imported content of at least 
50 percent. 
  25subsidy rates and because export discoveries also declined sharply. In 2003, as the benefit 
was reengineered to meet the requirements of the Subsidies Code of the WTO, the 
amounts paid out fell off dramatically and have been essentially nil since 2004.  
  We attempted to evaluate the extent to which the RS had a positive effect on 
exports. We carried out two exercises, one with data at the sector level, the second one 
with firm-level data. At the sector level, with eight-digit level data, the growth in export 
volume over five five-year intervals was estimated for 1991-1996, 1992-1997, 1993-
1998, 1994-1999, and 1995-2000. This is the dependent variable in the exercise. The 
following equations were estimated with five different panels: 
 









Xi,t  = value of exports of product i in period t 
αi    =  fixed effects affecting exports of product i 
βt    = fixed effect affecting all exports in period t 
 
         0, for sectors/firms not receiving RS 
RSi,t  =   
         1, for sectors/firms receiving RS 
 
Taking differences, the sector fixed effects wash out and we are left with an expression in 
which percentage export increases for each five-year period depend only on a constant 
(the average increase in exports at the eight-digit SITC level, regardless of whether a 
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  The results of estimating this model are shown in Table 8. One set of results uses 
the entire database; the other excludes exports of less than US$1,000 in value in the base 
year. Our preferred estimates are those that exclude very small exports, since small initial 
values bias growth rates upward. Indeed, exports from sectors that did receive RS grew 
more rapidly than from sectors that did not. The effect is strongest during the 1991-1996 
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supported sectors grew by 89 to 60 percent more than other exports. This effect falls off 
gradually, becoming not significantly different from zero in 1994-1999 for exports of 
more than US$1,000 in value.    
    The second exercise carried out utilized a quasi-experimental “matching” 
methodology which finds for each “treated” firm-product combination (i.e., benefiting 
from RS) another similar one that was not treated (did not receive RS). We estimated the 
growth of export value for each product-firm, and its matches, in the five five-year 
periods and tested whether the treated product-firm combinations increased their exports 
more than the untreated ones. Two logit models for estimating the probability of 
receiving RS were used. In Model I, the probability is dependent only on the value of 
exports and the year of the export. In Model II, the probability is dependent on the value 
of exports, the year of the export, and the sector to which the exported product belongs. 
The matching product-firm chosen is the closest to the treated product-firm in terms of 
probability of being treated, value of exports, base year, and, in Model II, sector of 
provenance. Exports of less than US$1,000 in the initial year were excluded. The 
estimations of the two models and the results obtained from the matching exercises using 
each one are shown in Tables 9 and 10. 
   As can be seen in Table 10, Model I yields the result that treated product-firms 
increased their exports on average by 778 percent per five-year period. The control group 
of untreated product-firms increased their exports by 279 percent. The average treatment 
effect on treated product-firms was 499 percent. In other words, treated product-firms had 
export growth which was 2.8 times higher than untreated product-firms. The difference in 
export growth between treated and untreated product-firms is highly significant. 
  Model II results are similar, although less significant. The mean export growth of 
treated product-firms was 873 percent, compared with 284 for untreated product-firms, 
slightly more than three times higher. However, the difference is significant only at the 5 
percent level (one-tail test). 
  The results suggest that the RS encouraged new exports to grow and that an effort 
should have been made to retain the system, suitably modified if necessary to satisfy the 
requirements of the WTO.  
  273.3 Innova Chile, with Special Reference to the Business Innovation Programs 
 
Innova Chile is CORFO’s arm devoted to encouraging innovation. It was set up as a 
special committee within the institution, with its own 21-member board, seven each from 
the private sector, ministries, and CORFO itself. It runs six programs, the most important 
of which is the business innovation program. Most of CORFO’s innovation programs are 
of a horizontal nature. However, the business innovation program has been deliberately 
steered toward support of the specific clusters identified in the NCIC’s reports. CORFO’s 
innovation support can be classified in the following categories of programs: 
 
i)  Public goods of a pre-competitive nature. This program offers grants to 
business associations, centers, and foundations for the development of 
norms, technological infrastructure, and specialized information 
needed by all market participants. Grantees have included FCh; 
technological institutes associated with line ministries in agriculture, 
forestry, or mining; and business associations. 
ii)  Technological assistance to SMEs, consisting of grants for the 
adoption of new technologies. It is likely that this program will be 
merged with the horizontal programs in the GIF discussed above.  
iii) Support for nodes, which are very light administrative offices that seek 
to connect the technological needs of firms with suppliers, either 
within the country or abroad.  
iv) Support of gazelle firms (firms that have the potential for explosive 
growth). These grants are made through the intermediation of business 
incubators. They support start-ups and provide seed capital for 
business plans and their escalation into full-fledged businesses.  
v)  Support for business incubators and networks of angel investors. 
vi) Business innovation. This group of program brought together several 
programs already in existence. There are two types of programs under 
this heading: 
a.  Support for innovation by individual firms.  
b.  Grants for the development of new technologies given to consortia 
of firms (usually through business associations) and university 
  28technology institutes. The awardees must set themselves up as 
corporations. The results are shared by all firms participating in the 
program through the payment of royalties. These awards are 
handled on a continuous basis through a specialized window.  
vii) A very recent program has been the institution of a tax incentive for 
R&D. Firms that enter into a contract with approved research centers 
may deduct up to 35 percent of the cost of the contract from their tax 
liability the following year. In addition, they are allowed to expense 
immediately the remaining 65 percent. 
 
  Here we will concentrate on the business innovation programs. The funds are not 
generally intended to be awarded to specific sectors, and applicants are handled on a first-
come, first-served basis on a continuous basis until the annual resources of the program 
are exhausted (ventanilla continua). However, in the last couple of years, calls for 
proposals have been issued for projects related to mining, processed foods, fruit, tourism, 
aquaculture diversification, meats, wines, and genetic improvement, in line with the 
clusters identified by the CNIC. According to Innova Chile executives, about 51 percent 
of all funds are now awarded to priority clusters.
16 It is not clear whether that 51 percent 
corresponds to funds awarded through the calls for proposals or generally to projects that 
are within the priority clusters. In other words, the calls for proposals for specific cluster 
projects indicate that vertical policies are being applied, since they refer to specific 
activities and sectors chosen a priori by the authorities. On the other hand, it would not 
be surprising that a general program to support innovation from any sector (and thus 
horizontal in nature) did in fact elicit proposals from priority clusters, since these are, 
after all, sectors in which Chile already has a proven comparative advantage. 
  The fact is that most of the projects funded by Innova are in sectors in which 
Chile has a comparative advantage (mining and food). This is borne out in Table 12, 
which lists projects approved in the period 2000-2007 (CORFO, 2007). All projects, 
either at the individual firm level or that of consortia of firms and universities, involve 
applying technology to these sectors. Perhaps the only one that does not is in ICT area: 
                                                 
16 Interview with Claudio Maggi, Director of Innova.  
  29the development of a router by YX Wireless, a firm that also benefited from the Innova 
gazelle firm project.  
  It should be noted that Innova business innovation programs are not large. 
Altogether, the projects funded between 2000 and 2006 amounted to US$16.5 million, 
hardly a large sum for a country that has placed its bets on innovation in the sectors in 
which it has a demonstrated comparative advantage.
17 
 
4. Vertical Instruments 
 
4.1 Fundación Chile 
 
Fundación Chile (FCh) is a private, non-profit organization created in 1976 by the 
government of Chile and IT&T Corporation as part of the settlement for the Allende 
government’s expropriation of the Chilean Telephone Corporation (owned by IT&T) for 
the purpose of conducting research and technology transfer. Each party contributed 
US$25 million. In October 2006, BHP Billiton (the majority owner of the Escondida 
copper mine, the largest in the world) joined as a co-founder partner contributing an 
additional US$10 million, which was matched by the Chilean government. BHP Billiton 
joined FCh’s board of directors.  
  In spite of the fact that FCh is a private organization, the government has a large 
influence in the naming of its board of directors and president, which makes it in practice 
a mixed institution. It can be considered a vertical policy instrument, since its decisions 
lead to the development and adaptation to Chilean conditions of foreign technologies 
with a view to their commercial application. FCh has concentrated in six sectors, mostly 
related to the natural resources that are abundant in Chile: (1) agribusiness, (2) marine 
resources, (3) forestry, (4) environment and chemical metrology, (5) human capital, and 
(6) information and communication technologies. Eighty-eight percent of FCh’s 
investments have been in the marine, forestry, and agribusiness sectors.  
According to its own mission statement, the objective of FCh is to “introduce 
innovations and develop human capital in the key clusters of the Chilean economy, 
through technology management and in alliance with global and national networks.” To 
accomplish this aim, it promotes commercial projects that utilize technologies that may 
                                                 
17 The total sum mentioned refers only to those projects identified in CORFO (2007). 
  30exist in other parts of the world but are not in use in Chile, it undertakes technological 
research in its own labs, and it acts as a broker between different actors that need to come 
together to undertake commercial projects.  
Initially, the emphasis of FCh’s operations was in sectors in which the country 
exhibited serious deficiencies, such as nutrition, food technology, and 
telecommunications. Its most important objective was playing a social role, and it 
behaved much like a government department. Over time, FCh developed a market 
orientation. Its first activities were services and technical assistance in the production of 
vegetables and fruit. At the same time, FCh reduced its activities in telecommunications 
to devote itself almost exclusively to natural resource-related sectors. Its first projects 
were financed with the institution’s own capital resources. Over time, it has come to 
depend increasingly on fees for its services and on the resources of CORFO and 
CONICYT (Chile’s equivalent of the National Science Foundation in the United States), 
for which it competes with private firms.  
  One could define FCh as a semi-public entrepreneur, in new sectors where 
entrepreneurial activity may be suboptimal, and also as a kind of venture capitalist. Until 
the early 2000s it was the only institution practicing “industrial policy in the large”, i.e. 
making strategic bets on new industries. It could also be considered a mechanism to 
explore the product space in search of new export discoveries, in the manner described by 
Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2005) or Hausmann and Klinger (2006). It is interesting 
to note that cultivated salmon is unlikely to have been found in Chile’s “open forest” in 
1980, not being obviously related to copper mining or the burgeoning exports in that 
period (forestry-related products or fruit).
18 In fact, the decision to develop the production 
of cultivated salmon by FCh, culminating in the set up of Salmones Antártica in Curaco 
                                                 
18 The “open forest” is a measure developed by Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (HHR, 2005) that attempts 
to measure the number of products in and the “value” of exports that, in the world, are found in the export 
baskets of countries that have a similar export profile as the country in question but which are not exported 
by that country. It attempts to measure the number of products the country might be expected to be able to 
export with its current export package and the potential value of such exports, “value” being measured for 
each product by the weighted average per capita income of the countries that do export it (labeled EXPY by 
HHR). In a sense, if the number of products in and value of the open forest are low, it means the country in 
question is in a sparse area of the world product space and needs to make a big effort to discover new 
export products. At the other end, a high number and value for the open forest imply that there are many 
other products, and that the products are of high value, in the “neighborhood” of the country’s export 
package. Therefore, with the country’s current capabilities and sector-specific public goods, it can be 
expected to be able to continue to diversify its exports with relative ease.  
  31de Vélez (Chiloé island) may be considered a sort of strategic gamble on opening up a 
new area of the Chilean economy. The firm was later sold to Nippon Suisan, one of the 
largest food producers of Japan. It paid off handsomely. Not only did FCh make a tidy 
profit on its investment, but its decision led to a boom in salmon and other fish exports, 
which surged from nothing in 1980 to about US$2.5 billion in 2008.
19 
  In a small and financially undeveloped country such as Chile, there is space for a 
public or semi-public venture capital firm.
20 The private sector is just beginning to enter 
this segment of the capital market. There is clearly a need to fund projects that are riskier 
than those in already established sectors, and the private sector is unlikely to do so on a 
socially optimal scale, simply because the amounts of resources required are large and the 
appetite for risk on the part of national entrepreneurs and financial institutions is limited. 
Foreign venture capitalists are unlikely to enter this market except in very specific 
projects, simply owing to lack of information.  
One of the roles of CORFO/GIF and Innova Chile is to stimulate the emergence 
of angel and venture capital industries, so far with limited success. FCh acts as a cross 
between angel and venture capitalist, undertaking projects that are normally at a stage 
that is too incipient for venture capitalists. The basic problem with both financial market 
segments is the absence of a mechanism to cash in on success: the exit strategy would 
require an active market for initial public offerings. Although there are IPOs in Chile, 
they tend to be few in number each year and exhibit clear cyclical behavior. Most of them 
are in tried and tested industries (e.g., construction, retailing). At present, the main exit 
strategy for innovators is the direct sale of the business outside, often to foreign investors. 
Because of the difficulties involved in exiting successful ventures, since 1995 FCh has 
insisted on partnering with private investors from the beginning of any new venture, with 
a commitment by the latter to purchase FCh’s stake after a certain time or otherwise 
winding up the venture.  
  Salmon cultivation remains FCh’s most spectacular success. But there have been 
others. One of them was the introduction in Chile of the cultivation of berries, through its 
                                                 
19 In the last couple of years the industry has been undergoing serious environmental and salmon health 
problems, due mainly to the shortsighted vision of the firms in the industry, which have not invested in 
adequately protecting the health of its products.  
20 FCh undertakes projects that are normally at a stage that is too incipient for venture capitalists.  
  32joint venture with a private firm in creating the first enterprise devoted to cultivating and 
exporting blueberries. While the firm later did not do well (after FCh exited the business), 
its demonstration effect was very important, and today Chile exports over US$150 
million.
21 In 1982, FCh pioneered the export of boxed and vacuum-packed meats. Today, 
vacuum-packed and boxed frozen private pork and beef exports are a thriving export 
business of about US$500 million.  
  Whereas emulation by private firms is still viewed as a problem by FCh 
executives,
22 it is in fact part of its success. Since many of its technological incursions are 
not patentable because they constitute the adaptation of existing technologies to Chilean 
conditions, in some endeavors it has had a large number of emulators. This is the case of 
salmon, blueberries, and vacuum-packed meats.    
  Besides salmon and blueberries, other ventures with variable rates of success, 
some of which have not yet matured, include: 
 
•  the cultivation of oysters, which are consumed domestically; oyster 
eggs are exported to some markets;  
•  the development of salmon feed;  
•  the development of a number of salmon vaccines; 
•  the first successful cultivations of abalone for Asian markets;  
•  the cultivation of turbot for export; 
•  the cultivation of asparagus for export;  
•  the cultivation of marine algae for human consumption and as food 
additives, and for use in pharmacology and beauty products; 
•  quality improvements in rice production that led to significant 
exports; and 
•  a firm that issues bonds backed by forest development by small 
producers. 
 
It sells important services, such as quality certifications, environmental 
certifications (especially in forestry), and technology licensing (the salmon vaccines 
                                                 
21 The story of the development of Chilean blueberry exports is told in Agosin and Bravo-Ortega (2007). 
22 Interview with Javier Duarte, head of enterprise development at FCh. 
  33being a case in point). It also receives fees for bringing together firms and researchers for 
specific commercial ventures.  
FCh has several interesting products under development. In the marine resources 
area, it is experimenting with several other species, including sea bass. In bioenergy, a 
process to convert wood pellets into energy has led to the creation of a firm, EcoPellets, 
with a view to entering the European and Japanese bioenergy markets. 
An important new venture in which FCh does not have an equity stake but acts as 
an intermediary between various investors and innovators is the so-called Atacama Solar 
Platform. This endeavor seeks to produce electricity with new solar panel technologies. If 
successful, it could have benefits that are larger than those of the cultivated salmon 
industry. It is expected that it has the potential for supplying a significant percentage of 
Chile’s energy needs, and the technology itself, which is at a developmental stage, could 
provide new exports.  
FCh runs its own labs in which it tests ideas developed by its staff or in joint 
ventures with domestic and foreign universities. The first stage of operations consists of 
identifying an opportunity to add value to production by means of an innovation, such as 
a change in the nature of an existing product, the provision of a service, or the change in 
production technology or business model. While not disdaining carrying out original 
research, the main aim of its research is to apply to the Chilean environment technologies 
that are in commercial operation elsewhere in the world. The emblematic example is 
again salmon cultivation, which was developed in Norway and Scotland. Chilean 
production grew rapidly since the establishment of the first commercial operation by 
FCh, and now Chile is the main producer of cultivated salmon in the world.  
The process by which an idea is discovered, developed, and converted into a 
business opportunity is as follows. The first stage consists of identifying a product, 
technology, or service that is profitable abroad and is not in use in the national economy. 
In the second stage, attempts are made to acquire the technology through a license (if 
needed) and to adapt it to the national environment through research and development. 
When the R&D effort indicates that the commercial application of the product or process 
is feasible, it is scaled up to commercial application in a variety of ways, depending on 
the product or technology: (i) the creation of a company, with strategic partners; (ii) sale 
  34and licensing of technology; (iii) supply of technological services by the various sector 
areas and business units of FCh; or (iv) certification and implementation of standards, for 
which FCh charges fees. 
FCh has had more than a few projects that have not panned out. One of them is 
the cultivation of the southern hake. According to interviews with an executive of the 
Foundation, for this particular venture to have become a commercial success on the scale 
of salmon would have required a much larger volume of resources than those that have 
been made available to the project.
23 FCh is loath to spend more than US$3 million on a 
project, and the southern hake project requires, in his estimation, about US$20 million 
over a 10-year period. The project is still in the pipeline, but it is not being actively 
pursued at the present time.  
In addition, funding agencies such as CORFO and CONICYT normally do not 
provide funds on the scale and for the periods of time that are required for success in 
developing a new technology or adapting a foreign technology for commercial 
application. In fact, an influential observer believes that FCh needs the government to 
allocate funds to build an endowment of US$100 million, compared with its net worth 
today of about US$50 million. The income from such an endowment would allow it to 
make strategic choices in developing products that require substantially greater resources 
than those available to it, and which have maturities much longer than those the 
Foundation can afford to undertake.
24 
Other projects, such as farmed turbot or abalone, have not lived up to 
expectations. It may be too early to judge, but the gestation period of these products has 
been unusually long, the firms that produce them having been set up in the late 1990s. In 
fact, serious liquidity problems at the end of 2008 led them to merge.  
Other ventures have been commercially successful for FCh but not socially 
profitable. One such case is CENTEC, a furniture manufacturer, which was sold in the 
mid-1990s to private interests, did not do well, and had no followers. To this day, Chile 
does not export important volumes of furniture. Finally, FCh had a low private return in 
blueberries, and the private entrepreneur who bought the company (Berries La Unión) 
                                                 
23 Interview with Marcelo Vásquez, Manager of New Business Projects and Marketing.  
24 Interview with Eduardo Bitrán, President of the CNIC, and former senior executive in both CORFO and 
Fundación Chile.  
  35went bankrupt because of management problems. But the social return has been very 
high. A similar statement can be made about vacuum-packed meats.  
  FCh faces a fundamental tradeoff between generating new products, services or 
processes that are privately profitable but which ensure its subsistence, and investing in 
ventures that are highly risky, privately less profitable, or profitable only over an 
extended period of time, but have a high social rate of return. Some examples of this 
tradeoff have already been mentioned. In addition, R&D in sectors that are already 
successful may be more privately profitable than investing in sectors which are new to 
the national economy and in which risks are high.  
  It would be socially optimal to remove FCh from the need to have to raise all or 
most of its resources through market-based endeavors, such as sales of services or quick 
success in setting up a commercially viable firm. Of course, success must be measured by 
eventual profits and income. But given the nature and social purpose of FCh and the fact 
that it has a development goal, the need to meet the test of the market over the short or 
medium run makes it less functional to its objectives than what it could be. This means 
that its economic results should be measured at long intervals, say, five- to 10-year 
periods, and that social returns ought to be factored into the evaluation.  
  If it is to become more of an angel/venture capital entity, its capital resources are 
probably too small. This route would require it to invest in many ventures with long 
gestation periods and with uncertain results. Small amounts of capital and a private-sector 
orientation lead to lower risk taking and emphasis on projects with shorter gestation 
periods. 
  These two tradeoffs—between private and social returns, on the one hand, and 
between risk and return, on the other—can be seen in Figure 5.  In terms of Figure 5A, 
FCh tends to position itself in the High-private-returns quadrants, and the socially 
desirable outcome is to have it move increasingly to the Low-private-return, High-social-
returns quadrant. In terms of Figure 5B, which shows the tradeoff between risk and 
return, FCh appears to be excessively concentrated in the Low-risk, High-return quadrant, 
while it may be socially desirable for it to move more into the High-risk, High-return 
quadrant.  
  36 These observations and schematic form of presenting the activities of FCh are not 
meant to imply that it does not undertake low-private-return, high-social-return, or high-
risk ventures. Examples of risky ventures with higher social than private returns have 
been given above. The contention is that FCh is in an ideal position to undertake more of 
these socially desirable activities. In a country with a low degree of absorption of foreign 
technologies and with a negligible venture capital market, FCh could become much more 
important than it has been. Its capability for doing so has been proven by its track record.  
Both of these objectives can be accomplished by endowing it with a greater capital base, 
which can come only from the government. What the authorities need to do is to clarify 
the role the institution is meant to play in the productive transformation of the country. If 
it is to become a true development institution, it will have to stress less short-term private 
profitability and more long-term social returns.  
 
4.2  FDI Attraction in High Technology 
 
Beginning in 2000, CORFO launched its first program to attract FDI, which involved 
explicit up-front subsidies. This program has a sector orientation (information and 
communications technologies, ICT), and, in this sense, it is clearly vertical.
25 The 
program has three aspects. First, an effort is made to promote the country as an attractive 
location for this type of investment. Chile has locational advantages for many types of 
FDI, but particularly for FDI in this group of industries. Its business environment is stable 
and rules-based, the country has an advanced telecommunications infrastructure, it has 
good engineering human resources, and it is in the same time zone as the eastern United 
States.  
Second, the program offers services to potential investors (assisting them with 
bureaucratic transactions, obtaining permits, etc.) and grants a number of subsidies to 
firms investing in the country. It was decided that firms in the following areas would 
qualify: software production; production of hardware; services using intensively ICT, 
such as call centers and business process offshoring; production and diffusion of 
multimedia contents; biotechnology and pharmaceutical products; and production of new 
materials. Since the publication of CNIC’s white papers, certain other sectors were 
                                                 
25 The program is analyzed in Nelson (2007). 
  37added: firms specializing in technology for mining and agribusiness, firms investing in 
global or technological services, firms that can assist in closing identifiable technology 
gaps, and those producing unconventional renewable energy.  
There are seven subsidies for which firms that invest a minimum of US$500,000 
may apply: 
 
1.  A subsidy for feasibility studies of up to US$30,000; 
2.  A subsidy of up to US$30,000 for the formulation of a work plan 
leading to the initiation of operations; 
3.  A subsidy for the acquisition of land or buildings, not to exceed US$2 
million; 
4.  A subsidy for the rental cost of facilities for a maximum period of five 
years, not to exceed US$1 million;
26 
5.  Subsidies for training programs, not to exceed US$100,000; 
6.  Subsidies for the first year of employment of workers in call centers or 
client-oriented services, not to exceed 25 percent of the wages of such 
workers or a maximum of US$5,000 per worker; 
7.  Subsidies for the first year of employment of highly skilled workers in 
ICT ventures, up to a maximum of 50 percent of the wages of such 
workers or US$25,000 per worker. 
 
In an economic sense, these subsidies are paying for two different sets of costs: 
the cost of setting up business in an unknown environment, and the cost of providing 
sector-specific and firm-specific training to workers. The first type of subsidy involves 
overcoming a friction that has unknown costs to the firm. The economic argument for the 
second type involves internalizing an externality. To the extent that the skills acquired 
can be deployed in other firms, the subsidy is covering the externality of such learning.  
Prospective investors may apply for these subsidies at any time, and they are 
granted until the annual budgeted amount is exhausted. The program began with very 
limited resources (a budget of about US$700,000 per annum), but in 2006-2007 the 
                                                 
26 This subsidy is complementary to the subsidy on investments in land or buildings. Both together cannot 
exceed US$2 million. 
  38annual approved budget has been on the order of US$7 million, jumping to US$11.2 
million in 2008 (see Figure 6). Applications are reviewed by a committee consisting of 
the Minister of Economy, CORFO’s Executive Vice President, CORFO’s General 
Manager, a representative of the Ministry of Finance, the Executive Vice President of the 
Foreign Investments Committee (who approves foreign investment applications), and two 
private sector executives or well-known professionals. The committee agrees to a 
package of incentives on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the possibility that the 
investment might have been made even without incentives.    
Originally, the program was conceived as an incentive mainly to ICT firms. It was 
developed as a direct consequence of Chile’s failure to land an Intel semiconductor plant.  
Intel’s senior executives had Chile on their short list but eventually decided to install the 
plant in Costa Rica, where the firm was offered an interesting package of incentives, 
whereas it had been unable to secure any in Chile. At the time (1994), Chile had no 
program to attract FDI, and the authorities insisted on complete neutrality and national 
treatment for foreign investors. It should be noted that the Constitution prohibits the 
government from granting tax incentives to individual firms.  
The launching of the program coincided with the bursting of the technology 
bubble in the United States, forcing CORFO to re-evaluate its FDI attraction program. 
Consequently, between 2001 and 2004, the program was reoriented to firms that wished 
to establish back office and call center operations in Chile. In 2005-2007, the emphasis 
shifted back to information technology. However, business services, software 
development, and shared information technology services for multinational companies 
have constituted the bulk of the investments that have arrived. Recently, with the arrival 
of Tata Consulting Services, it became clear that Chile could be attractive to Indian 
companies wishing to develop software for Spanish-speaking countries and for export to 
the United States.  
The emphasis on FDI in high-technology industries has led to efforts to improve 
human capital, particularly in business competence in English. Through international 
bidding, CORFO has awarded a contract to train 1,000 young people in business English, 
and is planning an additional such program for 2,000 people in 2009. In terms of the 
classification of industrial policies used in this study, this program would qualify as the 
  39provision of a public good to specific industries that require it, and would be located in 
the VP quadrant. It thus constitutes an indispensable supplement to the VM policies 
emphasized by the High Technology program. 
The results so far have been quite promising. Seventy firms have benefited from 
subsidies, of which 37 received subsidies that went beyond feasibility studies (in other 
words, they decided to set up in Chile). A list of the 31 most important companies with 
Chilean subsidiaries that have been attracted by the program is shown in Table 12. As a 
consequence of the program, the recorded exports of services of the promoted firms have 
risen to slightly over US$168 million. Total service exports may in fact be larger, since a 
good portion of these exports is intrafirm, and, at any rate, service exports are poorly 
recorded. By 2010, CORFO officials hope to reach the goal of US$ 1 billion in exports 
since the program’s inception.
27 In the nine years since it has been in operation, the 
program has approved about US$35 in subsidies. The average subsidy per firm has been 
on the order of US$951,000, with feasibility studies being minimal (US$25,000 per firm). 
Since its inception in 2000, the program has generated 7,600 jobs.   
  To date, no impact studies of the program have been conducted. Thus, it is not 
possible to determine whether the program has been a success from the point of view of a 
social cost-benefit analysis. Nonetheless, the results seem fairly impressive so far, and the 
resources expended have been rather modest. If one had to fault the program for 
something, it would be for its small budget. If so much has been done with so little, one 
can imagine that very significant results could be obtained with more resources.  
  A study carried out in 2004 shows how small the Chilean effort is in comparison 
with others, such as Ireland’s (see Belmar et al., 2004). As shown in Table 13, in 2003, 
the Irish counterpart to this program, the Irish Development Agency, had a budget of 
EUR 200 million. It had 25 offices around the world, compared to just four in the case of 
the Chilean program, and a staff of 295 workers, compared with seven in the case of the 
Chilean equivalent.
  28 The budget of the CORFO program (about US$7 million per 
                                                 
27 Interview with Mario Castillo, the CORFO official in charge of running the program. 
28 In fact, the Chilean program had only one office manned by one person, in San Jose, California. The 
other “offices” were shared with other institutions of the Chilean government and were manned on a part-
time basis. The San Jose office turned out to be failure and was unable to attract any investments from 
Silicon Valley. Nelson (2007) is of the opinion that New York would have been a better site for that office, 
  40annum) surpassed that of its Costa Rican equivalent, CINDE, only in the three most 
recent years, 2006-2008 (see Nelson, 2007). 
  These comparisons suggest that a bigger and better funded effort would yield 
greater catches and might just succeed in making Chile a center for business process 
outsourcing, call centers, and software.  
 
5.  Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
In spite of significant output and export diversification since the 1980s, Chilean exports 
remain heavily dependent on unprocessed copper. Transforming Chile into a modern 
economy centered on the application of knowledge to production is still a task to be 
accomplished. Rather than resulting from a deliberate strategy implemented with 
coherent industrial policies, the ups and downs in the fortunes of non-copper exports have 
been more the effect of medium-term real exchange rate fluctuations and, occasionally, of 
isolated policy initiatives. It should be noted that medium- to long-term real exchange 
rate swings in Chile are among the widest in the world. In fact, long real exchange 
volatility has increased since the country opted for a flexible exchange rate regime in 
1999, and which it largely has stuck to even during periods of balance of payments 
bonanzas and crises. 
  The surge of new exports beginning in the mid-1980s was encouraged by the 
severe real exchange rate depreciation stemming from the financial and debt crisis of 
1982-83. A contributing factor was a more pragmatic policy stance from economic 
authorities whose approach to industrial policy up to then had been centered on trade 
liberalization. Beginning in 1985, one of the policy tools deployed was the reintegro 
simplificado (RS). As we show in this study, the RS appears to have had a very positive 
effect on export growth, through the push it gave to new export products. One of the 
clusters that emerged over the past 30 years is wood, wood products, and pulp and paper. 
These sectors have benefited from one of the few exceptions to the non-interventionist 
ethos prevailing since the military coup of 1973.  
                                                                                                                                                   
since most of the firms that eventually invested in Chile had subsidiaries or home offices in New York. 
Their Chilean investments were more heavy users than generators of ITC. 
  41  Another exception has been the industrial activism of Fundación Chile, which 
was responsible for a few great export successes, notably farmed salmon, a product in 
which Chile has become a leading world exporter.  
  The fast growth in new exports and export discoveries that took place during 
1985-1997 petered out afterwards, mainly owing to the lagged effects of the gradual but 
inexorable real exchange rate appreciation during the surge in capital inflows (1990-
1997). Contagion from the Asian financial crisis led to another bout of currency 
depreciation, and to another positive shock for new exports. As copper prices rose in 
2004-2008, the real exchange rate took another dive, and the growth of new exports 
slackened. 
  There is a growing awareness of the need to have a more activist industrial policy 
because the market, left to its own devices, will not bring about the upgrading of the 
production structure and rapid long-term growth. This awareness has led to the 
deployment of more vertical policy instruments. The orientation of innovation policy 
toward 10 favored clusters has been one of these changes. But these efforts are more in 
the nature of “industrial policy in the small”: attempts to foster productivity enhancement 
and innovation in existing export sectors. Strategic bets have been weak and have been 
relegated to what FCh could do with its capital resource base and, since 2000, to a still 
very insufficient effort to attract foreign direct investment in information technology and 
in IT-intensive sectors.   
  The use of a large number of horizontal policy instruments, especially through 
CORFO, has continued. The emphasis has been on relieving financing constraints for 
SMEs through credit guarantees and special long-term investment credit programs in 
CORFO; technical cooperation programs of various kinds; the promotion of associative 
endeavors by small firms; and subsidies for innovation, both at the firm level and 
between groups of firms and business associations and universities.  
  Following are some of the conclusions of the study:  
 
  First, CORFO runs myriad programs oriented toward SMEs. While some 
programs have been evaluated, it is not clear that they make a coherent whole, or that the 
money is being well spent. 
  42  Second, the financing activities of CORFO, as well as FOGAPE, are indeed 
filling a gap in the financial system and are valuable to SMEs. If current lending 
procedures continue to be used, FOGAPE resources can be increased at little cost to the 
government, since the program even generates a small profit. CORFO provides longer-
term financing basically to the same clientele. The scale of such operations is too small, 
and CORFO is not properly organized as a development bank. It may be useful to 
transform the Gerencia de Intermediación Financiera into a bona fide development bank 
and to increase the resources it has for on-lending to the segment of the business world it 
serves.  
  Third, the scales of operations of both the program to attract FDI to high-
technology sectors and the business innovation arm of Innova Chile are too small to have 
a visible impact on the economy. The FDI incentive program has already proved its 
usefulness. Innova Chile is too new to have yielded important results so far. Both of them 
are inadequately funded. In addition, the resources supplied by Innova are probably too 
short-term to be genuinely useful in promoting business innovation, which has gestation 
periods that go well beyond the three years that are typical of Innova-funded projects.  
  Fourth, there is a need to redefine the role of Fundación Chile, removing the need 
to justify its existence in the marketplace from year to year. Its usefulness is in 
discovering new industries that can be competitive in the long run, as it did with salmon 
and blueberries. Its search and research activities ought to be geared to the long run, with 
a full understanding that most of its ventures will result in failure. It is enough that very 
few become new exports on the scale of salmon for its existence to be fully justified. In 
other words, it should move toward developing ideas that are too risky for the private 
sector to be willing to undertake, and toward activities that have higher social than private 
returns. This can be accomplished only by substantially increasing FCh’s endowment, 
thereby freeing it from having to earn its keep year-in, year-out.  
  Fifth, the RS was a good idea that should not have been abandoned. It was a 
small, low-cost subsidy that had automatic sunset provisions; in other words, a subsidy to 
market-oriented self-discovery. It is not realistic to think that it can be reinstituted in the 
same way, since it has already been reported as a subsidy to the WTO. However, policy 
makers may be able to think of subsidizing new activities in general, regardless of 
  43whether they are for the domestic market or for export. Another modality would be to 
subsidize exports of firms introducing new products to the export basket, but to base the 
subsidy not on the firm’s exports but on those of other firms exporting the same product, 
setting a limit in terms of total product export value.
29   
  Sixth, it seems entirely sensible to insist on sectors that have already been shown 
to have comparative advantage or to be able to develop one on their own, which is the 
approach that is being pursued by policymakers in changing their emphasis from 
horizontal to vertical policies. The idea is to add technology and knowledge to those 
sectors where Chile already has an international market presence or which have shown 
promise, and to find new products and niches within these clusters. But this should not 
preclude the big strategic bet, which has paid off so handsomely in the past. Business 
services offshoring, software, biotechnology, and new food exports should be on policy 
makers’ lists. FCh is an ideal institution for this sort of “industrial policy in the large”. 
More determined efforts to create an angel/venture capital industry also ought to work in 
this direction, given the country’s resources.  
  Finally, industrial policy doesn’t work in a vacuum. The wide medium- to long-
term fluctuations of the real exchange rate are deleterious to the emergence of new 
activities. Chilean policy makers would do well to re-examine their commitment to a 
rigid floating rule and develop a policy regime that ensures less real exchange rate 
fluctuation. Of course, the diversification of the production and export structure would 
contribute to less real exchange volatility, in what would be a virtuous circle between less 
volatility and a more modern economy.  
  
  
                                                
 
 
29 I owe this idea to Ernesto Stein.  
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  46Table 1. 
Policy Intervention Matrix 
 
   Horizontal (H)  Vertical (V) 
Public        Food safety:  SAG 
Input           
(P)           
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a   
a Together with other programs, since the unveiling of the white books of the CNIC, this program is veering 
toward support for ten specific clusters. Therefore, from a generic promotion of innovation, the CORFO 
R&D programs are becoming more vertical in nature.  
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  48Table 2. 
A Schematic View of CORFO Programs 
 
Department  Main programs 
Fomento (SME support)  PROFO (associations of small firms) 
  FAT (technical assistance) 
  FOCAL (quality improvement) 
  PDP (supplier development) 
Investment promotion  Todo Chile (for national investors) 
  High technology FDI attraction 
Gerencia de Intermediación Financiera (GIF)  13 credit lines, mostly long-term, for SMEs 
and for university students 
Innova  Public goods and precompetitive investment 
  Business innovation (individual and 
consortia) 
  Technological diffusion (aimed at SMEs) 
 Entrepreneurship 




  49Table 3. 
CORFO Subsidies and Loans, 2006 and 2007 
(millions of US$ and percentage of GDP) 
 
   2006 2007 
Departments (Gerencias)  In million US$  %GDP  In million US$  %GDP 
GIF 208.4 0.14 347.8 0.21
Fomento 40.2 0.03 45.9 0.03
Investment and development  7.1 0.00 12.1 0.01
Innova Chile  59.4 0.04 73.4 0.04
Total 315.1 0.22 479.2 0.29
Source: CORFO. 




Criteria Used by CNIC to Select Sectors and Clusters for Support 
 
  
Source: Based on the authors’ reading of Consejo Nacional de Innovación para la Competitividad (2007 
and 2008). 
  50Table 4. 
Growth and Investment Indicators 
(average percentage annual growth for GDP and exports;  
percentage share of GDP for investment) 
 
   1990 - 1997  1997-2003  2003-2007 
GDP growth   7.1  2.3  4.2 
Growth of exports (goods and services)  9.3  4.7  5.8 
Gross fixed investment rate  21.3  21.7  24.3 






A. Export Values, by Major Category of Products, 1990-2007 
(percentage) 
 
   1990 1997 2003  2007
Copper 45.0 36.2 31.6  51.5
Other minerals  9.7 7.6 5.6  6.0
Fresh fruit  10.0 9.2 10.6  5.6
Wood, pulp, and paper  10.6 11.9 12.7  8.9
Salmon and trout  1.5 4.9 6.8  4.9
Wine 0.7 3.0 4.0  2.6
Other food and agriculture  15.4 15.9 14.3  8.4
Other manufactures  7.2 11.3 14.3  12.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0
Total, US$ million  7,648 13,940 16,867  48,878
 
B. Export Volumes (2003 prices), by Major Category of Product, 1990-2007 
(percentage) 
 
    1990 1997 2003 2007 
Annual growth, 
1990-2007
Copper 35.2 30.3 31.6  24.2  6.3
Other minerals  11.4 8.3 5.6  11.0  8.4
Fresh fruit  11.7 10.1 10.6  10.2  7.7
Wood, pulp and paper  12.5 13.0 12.7  15.7  10.1
Salmon and trout  1.8 5.4 6.8  4.3  14.3
Wine 0.8 3.3 4.0  4.7  20.6
Other food  18.1 17.4 14.3  13.4  6.3
Other manufactures  8.5 12.3 14.3  16.3  12.9
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0  100.0  8.6
Source: Central Bank of Chile. 
 
  51Figure 3. 
Export Discoveries, 1990-2003 






















1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Central Bank of Chile, “glosas de exportación” 
database. 
  52Table 6. 
Export Successes, 1990-2007 
(exports in US$ million) 
 
A. Food products  Exports, 2007  Year discovered 
 Frozen salmon fillets   666.1  1991 
 Blueberries   158.0  1993 
 Mussels   78.9  1995 
 Cereal products   62.3  1994 
 Cheese   61.6  1994 
 Condensed milk   55.7  1992 
 Other meats and edible leftovers   49.2  1996 
 Frozen or dried sea urchins   48.7  1992 
 Turkey meat and leftovers   44.3  1994 
 Lemons   43.9  1992 
 Smoked salmon   37.2  1993 
 Smoked trout   37.1  1993 
 Tea, coffee, or herb concentrates   27.3  1992 
 Tangerines   27.2  1996 
 Meat sausages and preparations   25.4  1991 
 Scallops   21.9  1994 
B. Manufactures  Exports, 2007  Year discovered 
Mulitlayered paper  206.0  1996 
Ashes and residues  137.1  1997 
Pick-up trucks  135.2  1991 
Covered copper cables  66.6  1992 
Polyethylene sheets, films and plates   52.6  1995 
Liquified butane gas  48.9  2000 
Polypropilene sheets, films and plates  48.7  1995 
Petroleum ethers  45.5  1998 
Potassium sulphate  45.3  1998 
Iron and steel constructions and pieces  42.8  1992 
Other vegetable mucilage and thickeners   38.5  1991 
Data processing automatic machines  33.5  1991 
Polypropilene in primary form  32.9  2000 
Ammonium nitrate  32.2  2000 
Unalloyed iron bars  32.0  1998 
Molybdate (of ammonium or sodium)  31.5  1994 
Aluminum scrap  29.4  1996 
Combinations of refrigerators and freezers  27.0  1996 
Sacks (bags)  25.4  1995 
Drawers and cabinets for cold storage  25.4  1993 
Polycarboxilic aromatic acids  24.6  1994 
Seamless steel tubes  23.1  1992 
Printed material for registry  21.9  1991 
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on Central Bank, glosas de exportación database.  
Note: An export “success” is defined as a product that exported less than US$1 million 
in 1990, maintained exports above that figure after it crossed that threshold, and 
reached US$20 million in 2007 or before.  
 
  53Table 7. 
FOGAPE Activity Volumes, 2000-2007 
(money figures in US$ million) 
 
  Current clients  Stock of 
guaranteed 
credits 
New guarantees   Stock of 
guarantees 
2000 13,000 141.5  91.0  87.9 
2001 22,000  156.8 123.9 150.3 
2002 35,000  228.6 177.7 219.8 
2003 39,100  356.2 254.6 324.1 
2004 41,900  463.5 326.2 421.4 
2005 42,997  524.0 352.7 498.8 
2007 43,113  420.4 274.1 436.3 
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  54Table 8. 
Two-period panel model for export volume growth 
 
 
Constant RS Constant RS
(Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.) (Std. Err.)
1991-1996 10,930 0,885 11,746 0,597
(0,054) (0,088) (0,053) (0,084)
1992-1997 11,284 0,645 11,331 0,355
(0,057) (0,096) (0,055) (0,090)
1993-1998 11,278 0,444 12,100 0,237
(0,055) (0,092) (0,054) (0,089)
1994-1999 11,388 0,273 12,245 -0,044
(0,054) (0,090) (0,053) (0,086)
1995-2000 11,716 0,202 12,502 -0,105












Coefficients in red are not significant at 5% level.
Standard errors are robust.
  55Table 9. 




Logistic regression Number of obs =10764
LR chi2(6) =1063.63
Prob > chi2 =0.0000
Log likelihood = -6637.6519 Pseudo R2 =0.0742
RS Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
Exports -0.0000003 0.00000 -20.78000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000
year_1996 -0.2022963 0.08688 -2.33000 0.02000 -0.37258 -0.03202
year_1997 -0.1294326 0.08652 -1.50000 0.13500 -0.29900 0.04014
year_1998 -0.1711493 0.08563 -2.00000 0.04600 -0.33897 -0.00333
year_1999 -0.1934761 0.08530 -2.27000 0.02300 -0.36066 -0.02629
year_2000 -0.4441412 0.08585 -5.17000 0.00000 -0.61241 -0.27588
Constant 0.9717648 0.07120 13.65000 0.00000 0.83221 1.11132
Note: 50 failures and 0 successes completely determined.
[95% Conf.Interval]
Average outcome of the matched treated
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Variation 6629 777.8478 6169.857 -99.94 230794.9
Average outcome of the matched controls
Variable Obs Weight Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Variation 2341 6629 278.923 1969.88 -99.9853 55960.11
ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method 
(random draw version)
Analytical standard errors
n.treat. n.contr. ATT Std. Err. t
6629 2341 498.925 103.698 4.811
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual
nearest neighbour matches  
  56Table 10. 




Logistic regression Number of obs =9419
LR chi2(11) =2744.61
Prob > chi2 =0.0000
Log likelihood = -5086.1914 Pseudo R2 =0.2125
RS Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z|
Exports -0.0000002 0.00000 -17.580 0.00000 -0.0000003 -0.0000002
year_1996 0.4378241 0.10434 4.200 0.00000 0.2333270 0.6423212
year_1997 0.4508145 0.10395 4.340 0.00000 0.2470755 0.6545535
year_1998 0.4096669 0.10285 3.980 0.00000 0.2080759 0.6112578
year_1999 0.4456946 0.10220 4.360 0.00000 0.2453843 0.6460050
year_2000 0.3630384 0.10201 3.560 0.00000 0.1631115 0.5629654
SITC 0 -2.6845420 0.24216 -11.090 0.00000 -3.1591580 -2.2099260
SITC 1 -1.3513730 0.24940 -5.420 0.00000 -1.8401960 -0.8625488
SITC 2 -1.3066220 0.24796 -5.270 0.00000 -1.7926200 -0.8206228
SITC 3 1.8165300 0.33018 5.500 0.00000 1.1693830 2.4636770
SITC 4 -1.6518540 0.25192 -6.560 0.00000 -2.1456050 -1.1581030
Constant 2.0578140 0.24936 8.250 0.00000 1.5690720 2.5465560
Note: 35 failures and 0 successes completely determined.
[95% Conf.Interval]
 
Average outcome of the matched treated
Variable Obs  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Variation  5284 872.7423 6836.59 -99.9402 230794.9
 
Average outcome of the matched controls
Variable Obs  Weight Mean Std. Dev. Min  Max
Variation  1804 6629.00008 284.163 1783.518 -99.98528  55960.11
ATT estimation with Nearest Neighbor Matching method 
(random draw version)
Analytical standard errors
n. treat. n. contr.  ATT Std. Err. t
6629  1804 588.579 328.422 1.792
Note: the numbers of treated and controls refer to actual
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Trade-offs Facing Fundación Chile 
 




















































































  Table 11. Innova Chile Business Innovation Projects  A. Individual Business Innovation (figures in US$) 
Project   Firm 
Innova 
contribution Co-financing  Sector 
Building prefabricated homes  Empresa Constructora Rucantú S.A.  42,000  73,432  Construction 
Developing plastic wood panels  Wenco S.A  102,308  224,866  Manufacturing 
Bird watching tourism in Maullín river  Gallardo Mödinger y Cía. Ltda. 33,000  63,112 Tourism 
Using the Chilean abalone for immunological ends Biosonda  S.A.  134,006  197,052  Health 
Using biogas as an alternative source of vapor  Pisco Capel (cooperative)  140,402  159,830  Agribusiness 
Obtaining emu oil through biotechnology  Emuchile S.A.  62,476  76,476  Manufacturing 
Wagyu beef breeding  Sociedad Martinez y Calvo Ltda.  90,000  147,760  Agribusiness 
A salmon vaccine  Centrovet  400,000 543,334  Aquaculture 
Using biotechnology in copper mining (biolixiviation)  Sociedad Punta del Cobre S.A (Pucobre)  80,000  151,410  Mining 
Developing new fish products   Comercial y Pesquera South Wind Ltda.  52,750  67,738  Manufacturing 
Industrial door production  Refricentro  64,600  38,882  Manufacturing 
Controlling wear and tear in mining equipment  Cauchos industriales S.A. (Cainsa)  110,000  184,014  Mining 
Prefabricated housing and its components  Cintac S.A  89,298  239,648  Construction 
Transporting salmon smelts in isothermic tanks Maestranza  Tenglo  80,000  110,634  Aquaculture 
Controlling wear and tear in mining equipment HighService  100,000  204,204  Mining 
Application of sodium silicate in mining and construction  Austral Chemicals Chile S.A  236,000  204,634  Mining 
Development of GSM SPRS/EDGE router  Yx Wireless S.A.  130,000  326,937  ICT 
Technology for custard apple exports  Vital Berry Marketing S.A.  58,000  75,838  Agribusiness 
B. Innovation consortia 
Project Consortia 
Innova 
contribution Co-financing  Sector 
Robotic solutions in mining  Codelco and foreign mining and technology firms 2,280,000  9,127,054  Mining 
Wine sector development I  Wines of Chile and three Chilean universities  3,060,000 1,538,000  Agribusiness 
Forestry genomics  Several universities and national forestry companies  5,038,000  3,256,753  Forestry 
Genetic improvement of blueberries  University of Talca and two exporting  firms  669,752  682,946  Agribusiness 
Wine sector development II  Vinnova S.A. (Wines of Chile and two universities)  3,400,000 2,220,030  Agribusiness 
Source: CORFO. 
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 Figure 6. 
Subsidies to Firms Benefiting from CORFO’s High Technology Program, 
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Subsidies Investments Exports
Source: CORFO High Technology program.  
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 Table 12. 
Firms Attracted by CORFO’s High Technology Program 
(investment in US$ million) 
 
Firm  Year of 
arrival 
Investment  Number of 
employees 
Area  Subsidy
Delta Airlines  2000  3  200  Client/technical services  Yes 
Unysis 2000  n.a.  200    Client/technical  services  No 
Packard Bell  2000  n.a.  130  Assembly and repairs  No 
Altec (Banco Santander)  2001  23  589  IT center and software  Yes 
BHP Billiton  2001  n.a.  76  Shared services center  No 
Air France  2001  1.3  70  Client/technical services  Yes 
Citigroup  2002  n.a.  120  IT center; sofware  Yes 
BBVA  2002  80  180  IT center; software  Yes 
Tata Consulting Services  2002  30  1,500  IT center; software  n.a. 
Unilever  2002  11  200  IT center; software  Yes 
Int. Center of Excellence  2002  n.a.  70  Client/technical services  No 
Shell 2003  n.a.  60  Client/technical  services  Yes 
CellStar 2003  1.1  53  Assembly  and  repair  Yes 
Software AG  2005  n.a.  50  IT center and software  No 
Reuters 2005  n.a.  25  Client/technical  services  No 
Intersystems  2006  5  5  IT center; software  Yes 
Synopsys  2006  3.2  100 (projected)  IT center; software  Yes 
JP Morgan  2006  0.65  50  IT center; software  Yes 
Lafarge  2006  0.8  10  Shared services center  Yes 
MSD  2006  n.a.  21  Shared services center  No 
Sitel  2006  n.a.  1,000  Call center; BPO provider  No 
Transcom  2006  n.a.  550  Call center; BPO provider  Yes 
Unisono  2006  n.a.  641  Call center; BPO provider  Yes 
Teleperformance  2006  n.a.  1,450  Call center; BPO provider  Yes 
Konecta  2006  n.a.  1,400  Call center; BPO provider  Yes 
Atento  2006  n.a.  7,600  Call center; BPO provider  No 
Emergia  2006  n.a.  900  Call center; BPO provider  Yes 
Yahoo 2006  n.a.  10  Knowledge  center  Yes 
Evalueserve 2006  1  102  Knowledge  center  Yes 
Experian  2007  n.a.  300  IT center and software  Yes 
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Table 13. 
Comparison Between Irish and Chilean FDI Attraction Programs  
in High Technology, 2003 
 
   Ireland  Chile 
General data 
Years of operation  55  3 
Budget (2002)  €197 million  US$1.5 million 
Firms established  1,094  9 
Cumulative employment 132,246  1,097 
Professional staff  295  7 
Exports €65.2  billion  US$23  million 
Foreign offices  15  3 
Domestic offices  10  1 
Efficacy indicators 
Firms per year  19.9  3 
Employment per firm  120.9  121.9 
Professionals per firm  3.7  1.3 
Exports per firms  €59.6 million  US$2.6 million 
Source: Belmar et al. (2004). 